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This paper examines five-year compliance patterns among Wisconsin child support cases that
came to court in 1986–88. We find only limited support for the common assumption that compliance
with child support orders declines over time: the average percent paid is about .65 during each of the first
five years. The most predominant trend is an increasing polarization into groups of nonpayers and full
payers. Although we find considerable stability from year to year among nonpayers and full payers, there
is considerable change over the course of five years. Compliance during the first year provides some
indication of long-term compliance, but about half of fathers change their compliance rate over the
period. We find important differences between divorced and nonmarital fathers, differences that are more
pronounced than are apparent from a single year of data. Policy implications are discussed and further
research is suggested.Patterns of Child Support Compliance in Wisconsin
Children living in single-parent families are quite vulnerable economically, with about half living
in poverty (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996). This economic insecurity, coupled with the increasing
numbers of such children, has triggered considerable interest in the effectiveness of the child support
system.
Low compliance with existing child support obligations is widely acknowledged as problematic
by both researchers and policymakers. Nationally, approximately one-half of resident parents with child
support orders received the full amount due in 1991, one-fourth received partial payments, and one-
fourth received nothing (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995); low annual compliance has also been
documented in a variety of local and state-level studies (e.g., Bartfeld and Meyer 1994; Meyer and
Bartfeld 1996; Peters et al. 1993). Accordingly, numerous policy initiatives over the past two decades
have attempted to increase compliance rates. Such initiatives include intercepting income tax refunds of
noncomplying nonresident parents, placing liens on property of delinquent obligors, and routinely
withholding child support from the wages of parents with support orders. The most recent initiatives
were part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996, which
requires states to have legislation in place to rescind driver’s licenses and professional licenses when
nonresident parents become delinquent in their payments.
Despite the consensus that child support compliance is inadequate, existing knowledge about
long-term compliance is surprisingly limited. We know little about how aggregate compliance rates
change between the early and later years of an order, and more importantly, we know little about how
compliance changes from year to year at the individual level or how annual compliance compares to
compliance over the longer term. Such information is critical both in defining the problem of low child
support compliance and in designing appropriate interventions. This paper begins to fill these gaps by2
presenting data on aggregate and micro-level patterns of compliance with child support orders in
Wisconsin.
I. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical models of child support compliance typically posit that compliance is affected by the
nonresident parent’s ability to pay, by the economic needs of the resident parent, by the strength of the
ties between the nonresident parent and his/her ex-partner and children, and by the stringency of the
enforcement system; these models have been substantiated to varying degrees by empirical work
examining compliance at a particular point in time relative to the support order (see, for example, Meyer
and Bartfeld 1996; Peters et al. 1993).
This general model has potential implications for trends in compliance over the life of a case.
Prior work has shown that the nonresident parent’s ability to pay typically increases over time, especially
among paternity cases (Meyer 1995; Phillips and Garfinkel 1993), which could lead to increased
compliance over time. The availability of a range of enforcement strategies that can be used when
noncompliance is detected also suggests that compliance may increase over the life of a case. On the
other hand, the nonresident parent’s contact with his or her children typically decreases over time: about
half of nonresident separated or divorced fathers who have been separated for more than ten years see
their child once a year or less, compared to only 13 percent of those separated for two years or less
(Seltzer 1991). This decline in the strength of the nonresident parent-child relationship may lead to
decreases in payments over time. Furthermore, increases over time in the rate of (re)marriage among both
resident and nonresident parents may lead to decreases in the strength of the ties between households and
to decreases in the resident parent’s level of economic need, and both factors may contribute to declines
in compliance.3
Some research on aggregate patterns of child support payments over time has been conducted
using cross-sectional data. One simple and somewhat consistent finding is that child support payments
are lower among divorce cases in which more time has elapsed since the separation/divorce (Beller and
Graham 1993; Seltzer 1991). For example, 54 percent of fathers of marital children who have been
separated for more than ten years paid any child support in the last year, compared to 65 percent of those
separated less than three years (Seltzer 1991). Similarly, compliance rates (the amount paid divided by
the amount due) are lower among those who have been separated for more years (Garfinkel and Robins
1994). A limitation of this work is that the types of cases that have child support orders are changing over
time (Beller and Graham 1993), as are the available remedies for noncompliance, suggesting that
apparent differences between short-term and longer-term compliance may be confounded by cohort
effects.
The above research on aggregate compliance patterns tells us little about patterns of compliance
at the case level. A recent study uses case-level longitudinal data to examine child support compliance
over a two-and-one-half year period. Peters et al. (1993) examine divorce cases in two counties in
California, interviewing the parties within six months of the divorce petition (time 1), then again one and
two years later (time 2 and time 3). They find substantial changes in compliance between time 2 and time
3. For example, of the 32 nonresident parents who paid no child support at time 2, about half were still
nonpayers at time 3, about one-fourth had become partial payers, and about one-fourth had become full
payers. Similarly, of the 151 full payers at time 2, two-thirds were still full payers at time 3, with the
remaining cases evenly divided between zero payers and partial payers. Peters et al. conclude that
“although average compliance declines over time, there is considerable mobility in both directions” (p.
726). This research is an important start to an examination of case-level changes in child support
compliance over time, although sample sizes are small and the time period fairly short.4
In this paper, we build on prior work in several ways. First, we use longitudinal data to look at
aggregate compliance rates over a five-year period. By using longitudinal instead of cross-sectional data,
we eliminate possible cohort effects. Second, we look at year-to-year compliance changes at the case
level over five years, a period which is twice as long as that available in prior research. Third, we classify
cases with regard to their compliance trajectory over the five-year period. This provides a richer
understanding of the current state of child support compliance than has been available from existing
annual estimates. Fourth, we examine the relationship between initial compliance and long-term
compliance. Finally, we pay particular attention to differences in compliance patterns between
nonmarital and divorce cases.
II. DATA
The data for this study are from the Wisconsin Court Records Database (WCRD). These data,
drawn from the court records of child support cases in twenty Wisconsin counties, were collected by the
Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP) to examine the effects of several state-level child support
reforms. (For a detailed discussion of the data and sampling procedures, see Brown, Roan, and Marshall
1994). Because nearly all child support payments in Wisconsin are required to be made through the
court, the court case record almost always includes data on both support orders and payments, allowing
us to construct annual measures of orders, payments, and compliance rates.
For this research, we examine divorce and paternity (nonmarital) cases coming to court between
July 1986 and June 1988. These cases are followed until 1993–1994, with the exact ending date varying
according to the timing of data collection. We limit our analysis to cases with five years of payment data;
fewer years may result when eligible children age out, orders are cancelled (for instance, if the parties
reconcile), or orders occur too late in our time-frame to allow for five years of follow-up data. We select
a subset of these cases, eliminating three types of cases: cases in which private payments were allowed (35
percent of the cases); cases in which the effective amount of the child support order is unknown (about
one-third of the cases, primarily those in which the order is explicitly linked to the income of the
obligor); and cases in which the mother is supposed to pay child support (because these cases may have
different compliance patterns and there are too few—approximately 2 percent of the sample—to analyze
separately). Our final sample includes 512 cases. The results we present have been weighted to reflect the
total number of cases eligible for child support in these counties during this time period. During the time
period in which the cases in our sample initially came to court, immediate withholding of child support
was mandatory in 18 of the 20 counties.
Findings from Wisconsin may not be completely generalizable to other states. Some data show
that the child support system in Wisconsin is more effective than that of many other states: for example,
Wisconsin collected $6.09 in child support for each dollar of administrative expenditure in 1995,
compared to $3.60 nationally (U.S. House of Representatives 1996). This suggests that the percentage of
cases with full payment may be higher in Wisconsin than in other states. Further, this sample does not
include Milwaukee County, the major urban area in Wisconsin, because the WCRD includes very few
Milwaukee cases with five years of data. Thus, the findings may not be generalized to large urban areas.
(However, analyses not reported here indicate that four-year compliance patterns in Milwaukee are quite
similar to those found in our twenty-county sample.) The WCRD is used because no national dataset has
comparable longitudinal information on compliance with child support orders.
Defining Compliance
The key outcome measure in these analyses is the annual compliance rate, by which we mean the
amount of payment divided by the amount of the obligation. While we define compliance on an annual
basis, support is almost always owed and payed more frequently, typically ranging from weekly to
monthly. In the WCRD, orders and payments are aggregated at the month level. By focusing on annual
rather than shorter-term compliance, we reduce measurement error in order amounts, which may arise6
from computing monthly order amounts from weekly or biweekly orders, as well as measurement error in
payments, which may stem from payments being credited slightly later than the actual payment date.
In most of our analyses, we classify cases as nonpayment, partial payment, or full payment. We
define the latter as paying at least 90 percent of the obligation, in order to account for potential
measurement error as discussed above. We also present information on mean compliance. When
payments exceed orders, we code compliance as 100 percent.
III. RESULTS
Annual Compliance Rates
We begin by presenting mean annual compliance rates during the first five years following the
initial child support order. We also show the proportion of cases with nonpayment, partial payment, and
full payment during each year.
As Table 1 illustrates, the mean compliance rate remains quite stable over the first five years, in
contrast to the common assumption that compliance declines over time. For the sample as a whole,
compliance is .67 during the first year and .64 during the fifth year. However, the stability in the
compliance rate masks changes in compliance patterns over the five-year period, with fathers becoming
increasingly likely either to pay in full or drop out altogether. During the first year, 15 percent of fathers
made no payment, 36 percent paid in part, and 49 percent paid in full. By the fifth year, the share of
nonpayers rises to 24 percent, full payers increase to 54 percent, and partial payers fall to 22 percent.
Paternity and divorce cases show somewhat different patterns. Paternity cases exhibit a small but
steady decrease in mean compliance rates over the period, from .57 to .50. The share of nonpayers
increases from 20 percent to 33 percent, with a corresponding decline in the share of partial payers and
little change in the share of full payers. Among divorce cases, the mean compliance rate is quite stable,
fluctuating between .75 and .76. Similar to paternity cases, divorce cases also show an increase in the7
TABLE 1
Annual Compliance Rates During the First Five Years of Child Support Order
       Mean Nonpayers Partial Payers Full Payers
N Compliance Rate (% of row)   (% of row)  (% of row)
Total
a
Year 1 512 .67 15 36 49
Year 2 .67 17 30 54
Year 3 .67 19 27 54
Year 4 .64 22 24 54
Year 5 .64 24 22 54
Paternity
b
Year 1 189 .57 20 43 37
Year 2 .56 23 39 38
Year 3 .55 25 33 42
Year 4 .51* 30 32 39
Year 5 .50** 33 31 35
Divorce
a
Year 1 323 .75 11 31 58
Year 2 .76 11 22 66
Year 3 .76 13 22 65
Year 4 .75 16 18 66
Year 5 .75 16 16 69
The distribution of compliance categories differs by year (p < .01).
a
The distribution of compliance categories differs by year (p < .10).
b
*Significantly different from year 1, p < .10.
**Significantly different from year 1, p < .05.8
share of nonpayers, from 11 percent to 16 percent. In contrast to paternity cases, there is also an increase
in the share of full payers, from 58 percent to 69 percent.
Case-Level Changes in Compliance
While aggregate compliance rates remain fairly constant over a five-year period, with
nonresident parents becoming increasingly polarized into groups of full payers and nonpayers, these
findings do not indicate the extent to which compliance patterns of individual payers change over time.
In Table 2, we examine the stability of compliance at the case level. We present a single cross-tabulation
of compliance in one year compared to compliance in the next year, with each case contributing four
transitions (i.e., year one to year two, year two to year three, etc.) to the total. Results indicate that both
nonpayers and full payers show considerable stability from year to year: 79 percent of nonpayers in a
given year remain nonpayers the next year, while 84 percent of full payers remain full payers. On the
other hand, only half of partial payers remain in this category the next year, whereas 18 percent become
nonpayers and 32 percent become full payers. Finally, there is an extremely low rate of transitions
between nonpayment and full payment during consecutive years, with only 2 percent of nonpayers paying
in full the following year, and only 1 percent of full payers failing to pay anything the next year. The four
years which contribute to these results all exhibit similar transition rates, indicating that year-to-year
stability in compliance does not vary systematically over the first four years. For instance, the stability
among nonpayers ranges from 74 percent to 84 percent in years one through four, with no time trend,
while the stability in full payers ranges from 82 percent to 87 percent.
The last two rows of each panel document differences between paternity and divorce cases in
year-to-year compliance transitions. The rate of change from nonpayment to both partial and full
payment is similar for the two case types. However, paternity fathers who are partial payers in a given
year are significantly more likely to pay nothing the following year than are divorced fathers (21 versus
14 percent) and less likely than divorced fathers to pay in full (28 versus 37 percent). In addition,9
TABLE 2
Relationship between Compliance Rates during Consecutive Years
                                     Year n + 1                                     
    None    Partial      Full
Year n N (% of row) (% of row) (% of row)
No Payment
All cases 307 79 19 2
Paternity 138 80 19 1
Divorce 169 79 19 2
Partial Payment
a
All cases 571 18 50 32
Paternity 276 21 51 28
Divorce 295 14 48 37
Full Payment
b
All cases 1170 1 15 84
Paternity 342 1 27 72
Divorce 828 0 9 90
The distribution of compliance categories in year n+1 differs between paternity and divorce cases
a
(p < .05).
The distribution of compliance categories in year n+1 differs between paternity and divorce cases
b
(p < .01).10
paternity fathers who pay in full are less likely than divorced fathers to remain full payers in the
following year (72 versus 90 percent). This greater movement toward partial and nonpayment on the part
of nonmarital fathers is consistent with the decrease in aggregate compliance found among the
nonmarital sample. We document greater stability among both nonpaying and full-paying divorce cases
than Peters et al. (1993), perhaps because their compliance measure is monthly rather than annual.
Long-Term Compliance
While the above analyses document considerable stability in compliance from year to year, they
also indicate that compliance is not static, especially among certain subgroups. For instance, half of
partial payers change to a different compliance category in the following year, as do more than one-
fourth of the nonmarital full payers. This suggests that a single year of compliance data may not be an
optimal predictor or measure of long-term compliance and that categorizing payers on the basis of a
single year of data may obscure important differences among cases.
We turn now to a longer-term analysis of child support compliance. We begin by counting the
number of nonpayment and full payment years over the first five years of each case, with results
summarized in Table 3. Note that we are concerned here with total years of nonpayment and full
payment, regardless of whether such years are consecutive. Overall, one-third of fathers have at least one
year of no payment, including 8 percent who never pay. Nonmarital fathers are significantly more likely
to have one or more years of nonpayment than are divorced fathers: 44 percent versus 26 percent.
Seventy-two percent of fathers have at least one full payment year, including 29 percent who pay in full
during each year. Divorced fathers are more likely to have one or more full payment years than are
nonmarital fathers—80 percent versus 61 percent—and are almost four times as likely to pay in full
during every year—43 percent versus 12 percent.
To what extent is initial compliance predictive of future compliance? Table 4 shows the
distribution of years of nonpayment and full payment during years 2–5, according to the compliance11
TABLE 3
Compliance During First Five Years of Child Support Order
Total Paternity Divorce
Percentage of noncustodial parents
with support orders who:
Never pay during first 5 years 8 11 6
a
Have at least one nonpayment
year during first 5 years 34 44 26
b
Percentage of noncustodial parents
with support orders who:
Always pay in full during first
5  y e a r s 2 91 24 3
b
Have at least one full payment
year during first 5 years 72 61 80
b
The percentage in this category differs between paternity and divorce cases (p < .05).
a
The percentage in this category differs between paternity and divorce cases (p < .01).
b12
TABLE 4
Years of Nonpayment and Full Payment during Years 2–5 of Child Support Orders,
by Initial Compliance Level
Mean Annual
 Years of No Payment    Years of Full Payment   Compliance




T o t a l 6 31 43 2 5 4 8 11 62 . 1 8
Paternity 27 3 41 56 92 7 1 .09
D i v o r c e 3 62 82 0 5 2 6 62 95 . 3 1
Partial Payers
Total 177 63 31 7 44 39 17 .56
Paternity 82 58 35 7 49 39 12 .51
Divorce 95 68 27 6 40 39 23 .61
Full Payers
c
Total 272 89 11 0 5 36 60 .91
Paternity 80 83 17 0 8 60 32 .85
Divorce 192 93 7 0 3 24 74 .93
The number of no payment years differs between paternity and divorce cases (p < .01).
a
The number of full payment years differs between paternity and divorce cases (p < .05).
b
The number of full payment years differs between paternity and divorce cases (p < .01).
c13
category in year 1. Among first-year nonpayers, 86 percent have at least one more year of nonpayment,
including 54 percent who remain nonpayers during each of the next four years. Only 19 percent of the
first-year nonpayers ever pay in full over the subsequent four years, with a mean compliance rate of .18
during years 2–5. Divorced fathers who pay nothing in the first year have a better long-term prognosis
than do nonmarital fathers. Twenty-eight percent of the divorced fathers have no further years of
nonpayment, compared to only 3 percent of the nonmarital fathers. Further, one-third of the initially
nonpaying divorced fathers have one or more full payment years, compared to 8 percent of the
nonmarital fathers.
Initial partial payers fare somewhat better. Over the next four years, approximately one-third of
this group have one or more nonpayment years, more than half have at least one full payment year, and
the mean compliance rate over the four years is .56, more than three times the mean for the initial
nonpayers.
Finally, first-year full payers generally fare quite well, with a mean compliance rate of .91 over
the next four years. These fathers are unlikely to become nonpayers during the time period considered
here; only 17 percent of nonmarital and 7 percent of divorced fathers who initially pay in full have any
years of zero payment. However, such fathers do not necessarily continue to pay in full. Again, divorced
fathers have higher rates than nonmarital fathers: while three-quarters of divorced fathers remain full
payers during each of the next four years, only one-third of the nonmarital fathers do so. 
Compliance Patterns
In the above analysis we were concerned with total years of full payment and nonpayment; we
turn now to an analysis that focuses explicitly on trends in compliance. We devise a classification
scheme to describe the trajectory of compliance over the five-year period, assigning all fathers to one of
six compliance categories: nonpayment, full compliance, increasing compliance, decreasing compliance,
some payment, and sporadic payment. The first category includes fathers who make no payments in any14
year, while the second includes those who pay in full each year. The third and fourth categories include
those who exhibit a consistent pattern of increasing or decreasing compliance, respectively, over the five-
year period (defined in more detail below). The fifth category includes fathers who always pay
something, do not always pay in full, and demonstrate no clear pattern of increasing or decreasing
compliance. Finally, the sixth category includes those who are nonpayers in one or more years, yet who
do not demonstrate a pattern of increasing or decreasing compliance. We define “increasers” as fathers
who move to a higher compliance category between the first and fifth years (that is, move from no
payment to partial or full, or move from partial to full) and whose compliance rate never decreases by
more than 10 percentage points from year to year or in total. Likewise, we define “decreasers” as fathers
who move to a lower compliance category between the first and fifth years and whose compliance rate
never increases by more than 10 percentage points.
The distribution of five-year compliance patterns is shown in Table 5. Slightly more than one-
third of the sample exhibit stable compliance patterns over the period, including 8 percent who are
nonpayers and 29 percent who are full payers. One-quarter of the cases show a consistent trend in
compliance, with 12 percent categorized as increasers and 12 percent as decreasers. Finally, 39 percent of
the sample exhibit variable compliance with no clear trend, including one-quarter who always pay
something and 14 percent who pay sporadically.
There are substantial differences in long-term compliance patterns between paternity and divorce
cases. Paternity cases are more likely to be in the nonpayment (11 percent versus 6 percent), consistent
decrease (16 percent versus 9 percent), some payment (32 percent versus 20 percent), or sporadic
payment (21 percent versus 8 percent) categories. Divorce cases are almost four times as likely to be in
the full payment (43 percent versus 12 percent) and twice as likely to be in the consistent increase (15
percent versus 8 percent) categories.15
TABLE 5
Compliance Patterns Over Five Years
                                            Five-Year Compliance                                           
N None Full Increase Decrease Some Sporadic
All Cases
a
T o t a l 5 1 2 8 2 91 2 1 2 2 51 4
Paternity 189 11 12 8 16 32 21
Divorce 323 6 43 15 9 20 8
Year 1
Nonpayers 63 54 — 20 — — 26
a
Paternity 27 56 — 3 — — 41
Divorce 36 52 — 43 — — 6
Partial Payers 177 — — 24 13 38 24
Paternity 82 — — 17 15 41 27
D i v o r c e 9 5 — —3 2 1 1 3 62 1
Full Payers 272 — 60 — 15 23 3
a
Paternity 80 — 32 — 26 39 4
Divorce 192 — 74 — 9 15 2
The distribution of compliance patterns differs between paternity and divorce cases (p < .01).
a16
The next three panels of Table 5 show the distribution of long-term compliance trajectories
among fathers initially classified as nonpayers, partial payers, and full payers, respectively. Among initial
nonpayers, 54 percent remain nonpayers over the five-year period, 26 percent pay sporadically, and 20
percent show a consistent increase. While the sample sizes are fairly small, a comparison of divorced and
nonmarital fathers shows that initially nonpaying divorced fathers are much more likely to show a pattern
of consistent increase than are nonmarital fathers (43 percent versus 3 percent), and are correspondingly
less likely to pay sporadically (41 percent versus 6 percent). Among those divorced fathers whose
compliance increases, almost three-quarters increase to full payment (not shown).
Next, we look at cases initially classified as partial payers. Twenty-four percent are increasers
over the five-year period, while 13 percent are decreasers. An additional 38 percent make some payment
during each year, with no clear trend, while almost one-quarter pay sporadically. Divorced fathers who
initially pay in part are about twice as likely as nonmarital fathers to increase to full payment (32 percent
versus 17 percent), and are somewhat less likely to be in each of the other long-term compliance
categories, although these differences do not reach statistical significance.
The third panel illustrates compliance trajectories among initial full payers. Sixty percent remain
full payers over the entire period, while only 15 percent exhibit a decreasing compliance pattern.
Decreasing compliance is more prevalent among paternity than divorce cases (26 percent versus nine
percent), while sporadic payers are infrequent among initial full payers of both case types.
Sensitivity Analyses
We also examined compliance on the quarterly rather than annual level, and our basic
conclusions do not change. Quarterly compliance rates are slightly lower, with mean quarterly
compliance rates in the .61–.65 range, compared to .64–.67 for the annual rates. Between consecutive
quarters, 86 percent of nonpayers remain nonpayers, 40 percent of partial payers remain partial payers,17
and 85 percent of full payers remain full payers, results quite consistent with the annual results reported
above.
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to the specific definition of “increasing” and
“decreasing” used above. We considered including fathers who always pay in part, but increase their
compliance by at least 50 percentage points, in the “increasers” category (with a similar change for
decreasers); this would result in reclassification of only five cases. We also considered requiring at least
two years of increase (or decrease) to be classified as increasers (or decreasers), which also made only a
slight difference in the resulting classifications. Finally, we attempted to classify cases by fitting a
regression line to the five years of compliance data for each case, classifying cases as increasers
(decreasers) if the slope was positive (negative) and at least twice its standard error. This approach
yielded a lower percentage of cases classified as increasers and decreasers.
In all of the above analyses, we focused on compliance rates (that is, payments compared to
orders). Because order amounts can change over time, patterns of compliance are not necessarily the
same as patterns of child support payments. Over the five-year period, mean payments are quite stable,
and median payments increase from $125 to $152 per month. The order amount changes for about one-
half of the cases in the sample, with increases occurring three times as frequently as decreases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper has provided a descriptive analysis of child support compliance patterns over time.
We have focused on aggregate compliance rates over the first five years in which support is owed, year-
to-year changes in compliance at the micro level, and long-term measures of compliance.
We find that patterns of compliance with child support orders in Wisconsin provide only limited
support to the common assumption that compliance rates decline over time. Mean compliance among
divorce cases is extremely stable over the first five years, although it does decrease modestly for18
paternity cases. The predominant change over the five-year period is the increasing polarization of cases
into groups of nonpayers and full payers, with the increase in full payment concentrated among divorce
cases and the increase in nonpayment concentrated among paternity cases. 
At the micro level, we find considerable stability from year to year among nonpayers and full
payers, with much less stability among partial payers. The greatest stability occurs among full-paying
divorced fathers, of whom 90 percent continue to pay in full during the subsequent year. We find
virtually no transition (in either direction) between nonpayment and full payment in consecutive years.
Despite year-to-year stability, however, there is considerable change in compliance over the course of the
five years.
Composite five-year indicators of compliance provide a richer picture than do annual measures.
While 15–24 percent of fathers make no payment during a given year, 34 percent have at least one zero-
payment year. On the other hand, only 8 percent make no payment during the whole five-year period.
Approximately half of fathers pay in full during a given year, 72 percent have at least one full payment
year, and only 29 percent pay in full during all years.
Although many fathers change their compliance behavior over the five-year period, compliance
during the first year does provide some indication of long-term compliance. Initial nonpayment indicates
a high likelihood for compliance problems over the subsequent four years, especially among nonmarital
fathers. Despite the array of enforcement tools available, more than half of initial nonpayers—divorced
and nonmarital—never pay during the next four years. Initially nonpaying paternity fathers have a
particularly poor compliance prognosis, with only 3 percent showing a consistent pattern of increase and
a mean compliance rate of only .09 during years 2–5. Initial partial payment is also suggestive of long-
term compliance problems, although less severe than among the initial nonpayers. Finally, an important
finding is the generally positive outcomes among fathers who pay in full during the first year. This is19
particularly striking among divorced fathers, who have a mean annual compliance rate of .91 during the
subsequent four years.
Our analyses document important differences in long-term compliance between divorced and
nonmarital fathers, with differences more pronounced than are apparent from single-year data. For
instance, divorced fathers are almost four times as likely as nonmarital fathers to pay in full throughout
the five-year period; in any given year, divorced fathers are less than twice as likely as are nonmarital
fathers to pay in full. Nonmarital fathers with poor compliance are less likely to improve than are
divorced fathers, while nonmarital fathers with high compliance are less likely than divorced fathers to
maintain that level.
The findings reported here are useful in pinpointing where the key compliance problems
presently occur, and have implications for policymakers interested in increasing child support
compliance. The consistently lower compliance among nonmarital fathers, especially over the longer
term, offers compelling evidence that existing strategies are not sufficient for this group. Clearly, a
system in which only 12 percent of nonmarital fathers consistently pay their full orders and 40 percent
never pay their full orders, over a five-year period, is not functioning effectively. The persistently poor
compliance patterns among this group, coupled with the array of enforcement strategies available during
the time period covered by these data, suggest that enforcement alone may be an inadequate strategy;
efforts to improve compliance rates may also require focusing on nonresident fathers’ ability to pay. The
low rate of long-term full payment among those nonmarital fathers who start out as full compliers
suggests that efforts to maintain compliance among this group would also be beneficial. On the other
hand, existing strategies appear generally effective in maintaining longer-term compliance among those
divorced fathers who start out as full payers. For both nonmarital and divorced fathers, initial
noncompliance should be viewed as a strong warning of probable long-term compliance problems.20
Our findings raise important issues for future research. In particular, we need further research to
identify the mechanisms underlying the compliance patterns documented here. While theoretical models
and empirical findings suggest that enforcement, ability to pay, ties between nonresident fathers and
children, and economic need of the resident-parent family all contribute to child support compliance, we
have little information about how these factors operate in a dynamic context. To what extent do changes
in nonresident parents’ incomes translate into changes in compliance rates? To what extent do
differences in father-child contact account for the lower stability among initially full-paying nonmarital
fathers relative to divorced fathers? Do initial compliance habits tend to persist regardless of changes in
circumstances? This kind of information has important implications for the design of appropriate
interventions.
Finally, it is important to examine the generalizability of our findings to a national sample. The
effectiveness of the child support system varies among states, with Wisconsin more effective than the
national average in terms of support collected relative to administrative expenses (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1996). Further, we have excluded cases with missing information on order amounts,
which primarily includes cases in which orders were explicitly indexed to income for one or more years
of the period studied. To our knowledge, such orders are not routinely used in other states.21
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